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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(k). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court may inquire into a recommendation that a derivative 
action be dismissed by examining whether the recommendation is in good faith after a 
reasonable inquiry into the bases supporting the conclusions advocating dismissal. 
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 
1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990). 
2. Whether the trial court may evaluate the reasoning supporting a 
recommendation to dismiss a derivative action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
740(4)(a). 
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 
1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990). 
3. If the independent person specified under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
740(4)(f) determines that the Defendants acted with sound business judgment, i.e., within 
the "business judgment rule"; and concludes that the Corporation should not proceed with 
the derivative claims against it, can the trial Court still require the Corporation to proceed 
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with the derivative claims? Does this disregard the mandate in § 16-10a-740(4)(a) that 
the court shall dismiss the derivative proceeding? 
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 
1532, 1536(ll thCir. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes in this case are (1) Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(a) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a), which provides as follows: 
§16-10a-740(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the 
court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in 
Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith after conducting a 
reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the 
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the 
corporation. 
§16-10a-740(5)(a) A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued 
or settled without the court's approval. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case. The lawsuit concerns a business opportunity 
presented to Millcreek Coffee Roasters Corp., ("Roasters"). Roasters was incorporated 
on or about April 5, 1996. Roasters operates a wholesale coffee imports, roasting and 
retail sales business. Roasters was owned equally between D. Steven Brewster and Dana 
Brewster until on or about January 1, 2006, when D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster 
gifted shares of Roasters to their three children which left the ownership percentages as 
follows: D. Steven Brewster (47%), Dana Brewster (47%), and their three children, 
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Steven, Stacey and Tiffany, who each own 2%. (R. 647, ^ f 16). D. Steven Brewster and 
Dana Brewster were divorced on or about December 23, 1996, although they continue as 
business partners. (R. 534). 
Sometime in the fall of 2005, Roasters was approached, through D. Steven 
Brewster, with the opportunity to open two retail stores in the Salt Lake International 
Airport with Host International (R. 98, f 11; 537, ^ 29). D. Steven Brewster determined 
$200,000 would be required to fund the airport venture. (R. 1188). D. Steven Brewster 
told Dana she needed to come up with $100,000 to fund half of the airport venture, and 
he would fund the other $ 100,000. (R. 1190). Dana requested a business plan and 
additional information on the airport venture before she would come up with the funds. 
(R. 1212, Tf 3). Despite Dana's requests for information from D. Steven Brewster, she 
was given very little detail and information consisting of two emails, although D. Steven 
Brewster told Dana Brewster he had actual sales data from Starbucks Coffee and another 
coffee chain who were both prior tenants of the Salt Lake International Airport and did 
not share that data with Dana. (R. 1212-13, ffif 4 & 5). 
The airport venture was eventually funded with $100,000 from Roasters and the 
remaining $100,000 from D. Steven Brewster individually. (R. 1191). The airport 
venture has been very profitable and 75% of the money used to invest in the airport 
venture was repaid to D. Steven Brewster and Roasters in the first year the airport stores 
were in operation. (R. 1565, p. 29-30). As it turned out, Roasters would have had 
enough money through savings and ongoing earnings when combined with the earnings 
of the airport stores to fund the entire $200,000 for the airport venture instead of only half 
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of that amount. (R. 1228-30; 1565, pp. 33-34). Dana initiated this lawsuit against the 
defendants mainly because D. Steven Brewster usurped a corporate opportunity by 
retaining 50% of the airport venture for his own personal benefit as opposed to allowing 
Roasters to own the entire 100% of the opportunity. 
This Complaint in this case was filed October 31, 2006, and included the 
following causes of action: (1) Judicial Dissolution of Millcreek Coffee Airport, (2) 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (3) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) 
Removal of Directors, (5) Trademark Infringement, (6) Unfair Competition, (7) Tortuous 
Interference with Contractual or Business Relations, (8) Intentional Interference with 
Prospective Economic Relations, (9) Declaratory Judgment, (10) Temporary and 
Permanent Injunctive Relief, (11) Unjust Enrichment, and (12) Breach of Contract. (R. 
1-80). 
An Amended Complaint was filed April 5, 2007, that included all of the causes of 
action in the first Complaint, plus Wrongful Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity. 
(R. 530-625). 
A Second amended complaint was filed April 9, 2009, that included the following 
causes of action: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (2) Aiding and Abetting Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, (3) Trademark Infringement, (4) Unfair Competition, (5) Wrongful 
Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity, (6) Tortuous Interference with Contractual or 
Business Relations, (7) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. 
(R. 1397-1419). 
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Roasters eventually retained the services of R. Brad Townsend, a local C.P.A. and 
forensic accountant to offer a recommendation about whether or not Roasters should 
pursue the derivative action initiated by Dana Brewster or whether it should move to 
dismiss the derivative complaint. Townsend issued his report on July 7, 2008. 
Thereafter, Townsend issued an affidavit dated October 7, 2008, wherein he states: "It is 
my recommendation from a financial and accounting perspective that that the derivative 
causes of action are dismissed in the best interest of Roasters." (See R. 1026, ^  10). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court below. Roasters filed a 
motion to dismiss the derivative action on October 9, 2008 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
16-10a-740(4)(a). (R. 1031). Dana Brewster opposed Roaster's motion to dismiss. A 
hearing on Roaster's motion to dismiss derivative action was held on February 9, 2009. 
An evidentiary hearing wherein R. Brad Townsend testified in person was held March 
30, 2009. 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy thereafter entered an order that R. Brad 
Townsend conducted his investigation in good faith, but denied the motion to dismiss 
because of "questions concerning the reasonableness of Mr. Townsend's inquiry, as to 
whether the Corporation did all it could to fund the Airport project." (R. 1505-08). 
Defendant D. Steven Brewster filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(g) on May 5, 2009. (R. 1519). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Roasters was incorporated on or about April 5, 1996. 
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2. Roasters operates a wholesale coffee imports, roasting, and retail store 
business. Roasters was owned equally between D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster 
until on or about January 1, 2006, when D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster gifted 
shares of Roasters to their three children which left the ownership percentages as follows: 
D. Steven Brewster (47%), Dana Brewster (47%), and their three children, Steven, Stacey 
and Tiffany, who each own 2%. (R. 647, f 16). 
3. D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster were divorced on or about 
December 23, 1996, although they continue as business partners. (R. 534). 
4. Sometime in the fall of 2005, Roasters was approached, through D. Steven 
Brewster in his capacity as an officer of Roasters, with the opportunity to open two retail 
stores in the Salt Lake International Airport with Host International (R. 98, ^ f 11; 537, ^ 
29; R. 1565, p. 46). 
5. D. Steven Brewster determined $200,000 would be required to fund the 
airport venture. (R. 1188). 
6. D. Steven Brewster told Dana she needed to come up with $100,000 to 
fond half of the airport venture, and he would fond the other $100,000. (R. 1190). 
7. At the time the airport venture was funded, Dana Brewster had access to 
$100,000 in fonds through access to her 401k, IRA, and line of credit with Wells Fargo 
Bank. (R. 1273-74). 
8. Dana requested a business plan and additional information on the airport 
venture before she would come up with the fonds. (R. 1212, ^  3). Despite Dana's 
requests for information from D. Steven Brewster, she was given very little detail and 
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information consisting of two emails, although D. Steven Brewster told Dana Brewster he 
had actual sales data from Starbucks Coffee and another coffee chain who were both 
prior tenants of the Salt Lake International Airport and did not share that data with Dana. 
(R. 1212-13,1TJ4&5). 
9. The airport venture was eventually funded with $100,000 from Roasters 
and the remaining $100,000 from D. Steven Brewster individually. (R. 1191). Dana 
asserts in her complaint that the entire airport venture should have been owned by 
Roasters. 
10. The airport venture has been very profitable and 75% of the money used to 
invest in the airport venture was repaid to both D. Steven Brewster and Roasters in the 
first year the airport stores were in operation. (R. 1565, p. 29-30). 
11. As it turned out, Roasters would have had enough money through savings 
and ongoing earnings, along with earnings from the airport stores to fund the entire 
$200,000 for the airport venture instead of only half of that amount. (R. 1228-30; 1565, 
pp. 33-34). 
12. Dana initiated this lawsuit against the defendants mainly because D. Steven 
Brewster usurped a corporate opportunity by retaining 50% of the airport venture for his 
own personal benefit as opposed to allowing Roasters to own the entire 100% of the 
opportunity. 
13. Roasters eventually retained the services of R. Brad Townsend, a local 
C.P.A. and forensic accountant, to offer a recommendation about whether or not Roasters 
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should pursue the derivative action initiated by Dana Brewster or whether it should move 
to dismiss the derivative complaint. 
14. Townsend issued his report on July 7, 2008. That report did not say one 
way or the other whether the maintenance ofthe derivative action was in the best interest 
ofthe corporation or not. (R. 1565, pp. 36-37). Thereafter, Townsend issued an affidavit 
dated October 7, 2008, wherein he makes the conclusory statement: "It is my 
recommendation from a financial and accounting perspective that that the derivative 
causes of action are dismissed in the best interest of Roasters." (See R. 1026, ^ f 10). Mr. 
Townsend received no new information from the time he issued his inconclusive report 
on July 7, 2008, and when he issued his conclusory affidavit recommending dismissal of 
the derivative action on October 7, 2008. (R. 1565, pp. 37-38). 
15. The report of R. Brad Townsend answered a series of questions presented 
by Roaster's counsel regarding the financial condition and standing of Roasters, 
culminating in the final question of "Is the maintenance ofthe derivative proceeding in 
the best interest of Roasters?" Townsend's answer to this inquiry is summarized in the 
table below: 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
1 6. Is the maintenance of 
the derivative proceeding 
in the best interest of 
Roasters? (R. 1289). 
MR. TOWNSEND'S RESPONSE 1 
"The answer to this question is complex and appears to be more 1 
a question of fact than of expert opinion." (R. 1289) (emphasis 
added). 
"Whether or not the defendant(s) have a fiduciary responsibility 
in the various areas alleged by Ms. Brewster is either a question 
of fact or law but not an accounting question." (R. 1289-90) 
(emphasis added). | 
"Ms. Brewster alleges that Roasters and Mr. Brewster had a 
fiduciary obligation to retain the Airport opportunity within 
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Roasters, even if it meant incurring debt that had to be 
personally guaranteed. This is not an accounting question but is 
a legal question or question of fact that cannot be answered by 
a forensic accounting analysis." (R. 1290) (emphasis added) 
"Whether or not Mr. Brewster had a fiduciary responsibility to 
employ a different structure [incurring debt rather expansion 
through equity] is, again, a question of law or fact. (R. 1291) 
(emphasis added) 
"The cost^benefit relationship [cost of litigation versus potential 
recovery] is outside the scope of our expertise." (R. 1291). 
16. Roasters had $197,000 cash on hand at the end of 2007, after contributing 
$100,00 to the airport venture and making distributions to owners, revealing that Roasters 
could have funded the entire $200,000 investment in the airport venture on its own with 
contributions from ongoing revenues from the airport stores. (R. 1229) 
17- At the evidentiary hearing before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy R. 
Brad Townsend testified his July 7, 2008 report did not answer the question as to whether 
dismissal of the derivative action was in the best interest of the corporation. 
Q. It's on page 7. The question that's presented to you is the following: 
Is the maintenance of the derivative proceeding in the best interest of 
Roasters? Your answer to that is - it goes on for a couple of pages, 
but initially your initial paragraph says: 
A. The answer to this question is complex, and appears to be more a 
question of fact than of expert opinion. 
Q. You don't really even say yes or not in this answer, correct? 
A. Well, you just read one sentence of a two-and-a-half page response 
to that question. 
Q. Right, but can you show me where you say in that response it is not 
in the best interest of the corporation to proceed with the derivative 
action? 
A. I don't in this letter, because I was addressing the entire question -
and we went over this in my deposition. I was addressing the entire 
question of whether the derivative action should be retained with 
regard to all the legal and factual issues that are also considered in 
that point. When I drafted my affidavit, I was asked from a financial 
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Q-
A. 
A. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
and accounting standpoint should the derivative action be preserved 
by the company. 
Well-
My opinion between July of 2008 and October of 2008 with regard 
to the financial and accounting aspects didn't change. 
Okay. That's - we'll have to agree to disagree on that. In your 
response to the very direct question on No. 6 as to whether the 
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of 
Roasters, you don't say yes or no in your report. 
I do with regard with financial and accounting issues. I don't say the 
derivative action shouldn't be retained, but I say with regard to 
financial and accounting issues -
Right. Well, that's what I'm getting at. You don't say that it should 
or should not be retained. 
Oh, okay. Well, that's fair. That's fair. 
And there was no new information that you analyzed or looked at 
between the time you rendered the answer in your report on July 7th 
to the time you signed your affidavit on October 7th of 2008. 
That's true, yeah. 
(R. 1565, pp. 36-38). 
18. The decision on funding the airport venture was made by D. Steven 
Brewster, not by the board of directors: 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
THE COURT: Now you said that funding through this outside 
source that was fairly followed in this case, you thought was a sound 
business judgment; is that right - in this instance. 
Funding - 1 guess I don't understand the -
THE COURT: Using t h e -
Oh, using an outside entity? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
Yes. 
THE COURT: And that was a sound business judgment; is that 
right? 
Yes. 
THE COURT: Who made that judgment? 
Steve Brewster did. 
THE COURT: Dana Brewster was not part of making that decision, 
or she did not concur in that decision? 
I think she had different positions on that particular issue because of 
the conflict between the parties. There's some indications that she 
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thought it would be okay to do it the way they had done other 
ventures outside the business entity, but there's also clearly 
communications from Ms. Brewster adamantly stating that she 
thought the entire project needed to be done in Roasters. Ultimately, 
the structure that was employed was employed by Steve Brewster. 
Q. THE COURT: So the business judgment was made by a minority 
shareholder in the business that you're referring to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. THE COURT: It was not a corporate decision? 
A. Well, he is a minority shareholder, but he was the corporate 
president, so I'm not which sure hat he had on at the time. 
Q. THE COURT: All right. Was it made by the board of directors for 
the corporation -
A. No. 
Q. THE COURT: - or just by him? 
A. Just by him. The reason I view it as a sound business judgment is 
that the corporation - the corporation was an equity investor, and so 
to the extent that it was done outside of Roasters, that made Mr. 
Brewster's money also equity money, so it reduced the risk to the 
corporation, because in case of - in a situation where the business 
opportunity had not gone well, the - had it been done with debt, the 
creditor would have been in line ahead of the corporation. The way 
it was structured, it reduced the risk to the corporation on its equity 
investment. 
Q. THE COURT: But who should make the decision, in your view, as 
to whether the risk should be taken? Should that be a corporate 
decision or an individual officer's decision or neither? How to you 
see that? 
A. Well, I guess maybe we're venturing into the realm of me being a 
lawyer, but from my perspective it ought to be a corporate decision, 
as a practical matter that the officers make that decision. In kind of 
the ideal world, the board of directors would sign off on that, but in 
small companies -
Q. THE COURT: It didn't happen here, did it? 
A. I didn't happen here. 
(R. 1565, pp. 51-53) 
19. Mr. Townsend testified he did not see enough information about the airport 
opportunity that would make him comfortable in making an investment of $100,000 if he 
were in Dana Brewster's shoes. 
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Q. I want to shift gears now to talk about the amount of information that 
changed hands between Mr. Brewster and Mrs. Brewster - and Dana 
Brewster. Was there enough - 1 believe you stated it was your 
opinion that if you were the one analyzing whether to make a 
decision to invest or not, that there wasn't enough information for 
you to make an investment of $100,000, correct? 
A. That's true. With the documents I've seen, I would have - 1 don't 
know that I would have been able to make a decision on that. 
Q. In fact, I think in your deposition you characterize the quantity of 
information changing hands between Mr. Brewster and Dana 
Brewster as fairly minimal; is that accurate? 
A. Sure. 
(R. 1565, p. 26). 
Q. THE COURT: You said that - as I recall your testimony, that there 
wasn't enough information for you to feel comfortable about making 
this investment. Is that an accurate statement? 
A. It's accurate to say that if I had to rely solely on the documents that I 
had in the case, I would have probably wanted more information 
than that to make the investment. 
(R. 1565, p. 56). 
20. Mr. Townsend testified he didn't consider the corporation's ability to factor 
accounts receivables to fund the airport venture. 
Q. THE COURT: What does that - how much could they have funded? 
A. They funded 100,000. They ended up at the end of the year with a 
cash reserve of about $42,000. Let me just look here. Well, at the 
end of '06 the corporation had $42,000 and change in cash, but it 
had $65,000 in short term accounts payable. So I guess - as I sit 
here, I would say they probably couldn't have funded any more than 
they did. 
Q. THE COURT: Even though they had 42,000 cash plus short-term 
accounts payable of 65? 
A. Well, the accounts payable were things that were coming due that 
they had to pay, so they would have to pay the accounts payable and 
payroll and whatnot. 
Q. THE COURT: What were their short-term accounts receivable? 
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A. The accounts receivable were 123,000. So the -
Q. THE COURT: Was there an effort made to try to determine whether 
that was - you could factor any of that? 
A- I didn't. I didn't look at that. 
(R. 1565, p. 57). 
21. Mr. Townsend testified that the corporation only made one superficial 
inquiry into obtaining a loan to fund the airport venture. 
Q. THE COURT: Did anyone tell you -well, let me - le t ' s see. Do 
you know if the corporation actually investigated the oppor - the 
possibility of obtaining financing? 
A. There was an inquiry that Mr. Brewster made with Bank of the 
West, and I believe that was the only inquiry with regard to 
obtaining outside financing. 
Q. THE COURT: No other bank? 
A. Correct. 
Q. No other source of financing? 
A. That's right. 
(R. 1565, p. 48). 
22. This is the only case where Mr. Townsend has analyzed and offered an 
opinion about whether a derivative action should be dismissed or not. 
Q. THE COURT: All right. Only - you say this is the only derivative 
case that you've worked on; is that right? 
A. It's the only one where I've been asked to articulate an opinion as to 
whether or not to retain the action. I've worked on several 
derivative cases. 
(R. 1565, p. 53). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Judge Kennedy's inquiry into the recommendation for dismissal of the 
derivative action made by R. Brad Townsend to determine if it was made in good faith 
and based upon a reasonable inquiry concerning his conclusions and recommendation 
was proper, appropriate, and what is required by Utah statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based") and Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) ("A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or 
settled without the court's approval"). 
The trial court must examine whether the decision to dismiss a derivative 
proceeding is made in good faith based upon a reasonable inquiry, and if it is not, the trial 
court has the duty to deny the request for dismissal. Defendants' assertion that the 
language of Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-740(4)(a) requires the trial court to merely rubber 
stamp a good faith recommendation for dismissal of a derivative action without any 
inquiry about the reasonableness of the conclusion recommending dismissal is erroneous 
and not supported by the plain language of the applicable statutes. 
Accordingly, Judge Kennedy's decision denying the motion to dismiss the 
derivative action was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXAMINING THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF R. BRAD TOWNSEND 
While it is true that Dana Brewster stipulated to allow R. Brad Townsend to make 
a recommendation as to whether the corporation should dismiss the derivative action or 
not, that stipulation did not include a waiver from challenging the reasonableness of the 
conclusion or recommendation. Furthermore, it is clear that Defendants misunderstand 
the trial court's role in examining the reasonableness of the conclusions made by one 
appointed by the Board of Directors. Defendants' argument is essentially that once the 
person appointed to make a determination or recommendation about whether a derivative 
action should be dismissed or not, the trial court must simply rubber stamp the 
recommendation without any inquiry. However, that is simply not accurate. 
The controlling statute sets forth standard that the conclusions be reasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740 provides as follows: 
A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the 
corporation if a person or group specified in Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) 
determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which 
its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding 
is not in the best interest of the corporation. 
While there is no Utah case law right on point as to the scope and extent of 
judicial review of a recommendation to dismiss or allow a derivative action, there are 
other states with similar if not identical statutes whose courts have addressed this issue. 
For example, Florida's statute reads as follows: 
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The court may dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion by the 
corporation, the court finds that one of the groups specified below has made 
a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable investigation 
upon which its conclusion are based that the maintenance of the derivative 
suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
See Fla. Stat. § 607.07401 Shareholders' Derivative Actions. As can be seen, the 
language of the Florida statute is remarkably similar to the language of Utah Code Ann. § 
16-10a-740(4)(a). In Batur v. Signature Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., 903 So.2d 
985 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005), the Florida Court of Appeals noted, in construing the Florida 
statute that the recommendation must still pass judicial review, holding "dismissals of 
shareholder derivative actions may, as here, entail can evidentiary hearing with respect to 
the disputed issues of bias, conflict of interest, objectivity and reasonableness in the 
preparation and presentation of the report." Id. at 995. That is exactly what took place in 
front of Judge Kennedy on March 30, 2009. 
Further, other jurisdictions plainly hold that the judge has the right and obligation 
to inquire into the reasonableness of the recommendation to end a derivative action. See 
Weiser v. Grace, 683 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1998), which provides for the 
following standard in analyzing the recommendation concerning the viability of a 
derivative action: 
If the court concludes that the committee lacked independence, failed to 
demonstrate food faith and a reasonable basis for its conclusions or, if the 
court is otherwise dissatisfied with the process used by the committee, it 
must deny the SLC's motion. However, if the court is satisfied with the 
committee's independence, good faith, and the reasonableness of its 
decision, the court, in its discretion, may proceed to the second step. In the 
second phase, a court must apply its own independent business judgment to 
decide whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. The second step is 
intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of 
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step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where 
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder 
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest. 
Similarly, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del 1981), the Delaware 
court explained its standard for judicial review of a recommendation concerning a 
derivative action as follows: 
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith 
of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Limited 
discovery may be ordered to facilitate such inquiries. The corporation 
should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a 
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith 
and reasonableness. If the Court determines either that the committee is not 
independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the 
Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but 
not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the 
corporation's motion. If, however, the Court is satisfied under Rule 56 
standards that the committee was independent and showed reasonable basis 
for good faith findings and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its 
discretion, to the next step. 
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in striking 
the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a 
derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed in 
a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed 
by an independent investigating committee. The Court should determine, 
applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion 
should be granted. This means, or course, that instances could arise where 
a committee can establish its independence and sound bases for its good 
faith decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied. The second 
step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the 
criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or 
where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder 
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest. 
Id. at 788-89 (emphasis added). 
Even if Utah Courts do not engage in the second step of applying its own business 
judgment, the trial court must still examine whether there is a reasonable basis for the 
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conclusion to terminate or proceed with a derivative action. The result of just that inquiry 
may serve as justification for denying the motion to dismiss the derivative action. 
A. Cases relied upon by Defendants. 
The cases relied on by Defendant are consistent with the concept that the trial 
court has the ability if not the obligation to inquire into the reasonableness of the 
conclusions to dismiss a derivative action or not - regardless of whether the court takes 
the second step and substitutes its own business judgment. First, in Auerbach v. Bennett, 
393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979), the New York court explained "rwlhile the 
court may properly inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's 
investigative procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration 
of such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment." Id. (emphasis added). 
Also, in In re United Healthcare Group Incorporated Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, 591 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1029 (D. Minn. 2008), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
explained what justified the trial court in rejecting a recommendation to dismiss a 
derivative action, as follows: "Evidence that 'the investigation has been so restricted in 
scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a 
pretext or sham . . would raise questions of good faith.'" (citations omitted). 
Both of these cases are consistent with the review conducted by Judge Kennedy in 
evaluating the scope and depth of the investigation leading up to the recommendation for 
dismissal. Neither of these cases stand for the proposition that a trial court should blindly 
adopt the recommendation of an independent expert or committee. 
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B. Townsend's report was insufficient basis to sustain a dismissal of the 
derivative action. 
The main reason and justification for rejecting Mr. Townsend's recommendation that the 
derivative action be dismissed is the inadequacy and incomplete nature of Townsend's opinions. 
For example, in his report, Townsend answers a series of questions posed by counsel for 
Millcreek Coffee Roasters, Corp., leading up to the ultimate question of "Is the maintenance of 
the derivative proceeding in the best interest of Roasters?" As can be seen in the table below, 
Townsend is unable to answer these questions. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
6. Is the maintenance of 
the derivative proceeding in 
the best interest of Roasters? 
(R. 1289). 
MR. TOWNSEND'S RESPONSE 1 
"The answer to this question is complex and appears to be more a 
question of fact than of expert opinion." (R. 1289) (emphasis 
added). 
"Whether or not the defendant(s) have a fiduciary responsibility 1 
in the various areas alleged by Ms. Brewster is either a question 
of fact or law but not an accounting question." (R. 1289-90) 
(emphasis added). 
"Ms. Brewster alleges that Roasters and Mr. Brewster had a 
fiduciary obligation to retain the Airport opportunity within 
Roasters, even if it meant incurring debt that had to be personally 
guaranteed. This is not an accounting question but is a legal 
question or question of fact that cannot be answered by a 
forensic accounting analysis." (R. 1290) (emphasis added) 
"Whether or not Mr. Brewster had a fiduciary responsibility to 
employ a different structure [incurring debt rather expansion 
through equity] is, again, a question of law or fact. (R. 1291) 
(emphasis added) 
"The costftenefit relationship [cost of litigation versus potential 
recovery] is outside the scope of our expertise." (R. 1291). 
Faced with the inadequate responses to the ultimate question about the derivative 
action, Judge Kennedy had little choice but to reject the recommendation to terminate the 
derivative action because Townsend's report provided no conclusion at all—let alone a 
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conclusion that was supported by sound reasoning and analysis. There clearly was not a 
sufficient foundation for a recommendation to terminate the derivative action. Townsend 
admitted in the evidentiary hearing he doesn't answer the question in his report: 
A. My opinion between July of 2008 and October of 2008 with regard 
to the financial and accounting aspects didn't change. 
Q. Okay. That's - we'll have to agree to disagree on that. In your 
response to the very direct question on No. 6 as to whether the 
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of 
Roasters, you don't say yes or no in your report. 
A. I do with regard with financial and accounting issues. I don't say the 
derivative action shouldn't be retained, but I say the derivative 
action shouldn't be retained, but I say with regard to financial and 
accounting issues -
Q. Right. Well, that's what I'm getting at. You don't say that it should 
or should not be retained. 
A. Oh, okay. Well, that's fair. That's fair. 
(R. 1565, p. 37). 
The absence of a recommendation in Townsend's report is not cured or 
transformed into a well supported recommendation by the fact that after Townsend's 
report is issued on July 7, 2008, Townsend issued an affidavit dated October 7, 2008, 
wherein he states in conclusory fashion: "It is my recommendation from a financial and 
accounting perspective that that the derivative causes of action are dismissed in the best 
interest of Roasters." (See R. R. 1026, f^ 10). At the evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Kennedy, Townsend admitted he had received no new information from the time he 
issues his report and the time he issued his affidavit: 
Q. And there was no new information that you analyzed or looked at 
between the time you rendered the answer in your report on July 7th 
to the time you signed your affidavit on October 7th of 2008? 
A. That's true, yeah. 
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(R. 1565, p. 37-38). 
Again, when faced with the inadequate evidence of the report, and the unsupported 
and conclusory affidavit from Townsend, Judge Kennedy had no choice but to reject the 
poorly founded recommendation to dismiss the derivative action. 
C. The Utah statute allows discovery regarding reasonableness of 
procedures employed in making recommendation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)(e)(C) permits discovery into "the reasonableness 
of the procedures following by the person or group." If the trial court is merely supposed 
to rubber stamp the recommendation of the independent, good faith committee or 
appointed expert, why would discovery be allowed into the "reasonableness of the 
procedures following by the person or group" making the recommendation? Moreover, 
why would there be a right to interlocutory appeal if the court was required to merely 
rubber stamp the recommendation of an independent committee or expert appointed to 
make a recommendation? Clearly, the Utah statute contemplates some discovery in order 
to permit meaningful judicial review of the recommendation regarding viability of a 
derivative action. 
D. The trial court has the statutory duty to approve any dismissal of a 
derivative proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) states "A derivative proceeding may not be 
discontinued or settled without the court's approval." This statute is consistent with Utah 
Code Ann, § 16-10a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are 
based"), and bolsters Dana Brewster's argument that the trial court has the right and duty 
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to examine the reasonableness of the recommendation for dismissal of the derivative 
action. 
It goes without saying that if the trial court is placed in the position of approving 
the settlement or dismissal of a derivative action, the trial court must be able to examine 
and inquire into the bases for approving or dismissing the derivative proceeding. In the 
case at bar, Judge Kennedy had the right and duty to inquire into the reasons for the 
motion to dismiss the derivative proceeding—he is not expected to merely rubber stamp a 
recommendation without examining the substance of the recommendation. 
II. RECENT CASELAW FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ESTABLISHES A HIGHER FIDUCIARY DUTY AMONG 
SHAREHOLDERS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS WHICH 
PROVIDES FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR AFFIRMING JUDGE 
KENNEDY'S DECISION BELOW 
One of the issues analyzed by R. Brad Townsend concerned the fiduciary duties 
owed to other shareholders such as Dana Brewster from Steven Brewster. For example, 
in the evidentiary hearing before Judge Kennedy, Townsend testified as follows: 
Q. Corporate directors - is it true that corporate directors owe duties of 
loyalty to the shareholders? 
A. Well, it's my understanding they do. I mean I'm not a lawyer, but I 
- it's my understanding they do. 
Q. And full disclosure as well? 
A. That I don't know. I think so, but I don't know. 
Q. I think you said in your deposition that you believe that that was the 
case. 
A. I believe it is, but I don't -
Q. Okay. 
A. I don't really have - to me that's a legal opinion whether or not they 
owe that, but I believe that's the case. 
Q. I want to shift gears now to talk about the amount of information that 
changed hands between Mr. Brewster and Mrs. Brewster - and Dana 
Brewster. Was there enough - 1 believe you stated it was your 
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opinion that if you were the one analyzing whether to make a 
decision to invest or not, that there wasn't enough information for 
you to make an investment of $100,000, correct? 
A. That's true. With the documents I've seen, I would have - 1 don't 
know that I would have been able to make a decision on that. 
Q. In fact, I think in your deposition you characterize the quantity of 
information changing hands between Mr. Brewster and Dana 
Brewster as fairly minimal; is that accurate? 
A. Sure. 
(R. 1565, p. 5-26). 
In McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, f^ 22, the Utah Supreme Court established a 
new standard for fiduciary duties in closely held corporations as follows: 
Thus, the Massachusetts approach of recognizing broader fiduciary 
duties in closely held corporations better achieves the goals of the Act by 
stemming shareholder oppression and is the appropriate standard for 
evaluating fiduciary relationship among shareholders in a closely held 
corporation. Our adoption of the Massachusetts standard is a logical 
extension of our existing unique nature of such corporations and seeks to 
protect their shareholders by interpreting the Corporation Act with different 
corporate circumstances in mind. By adopting this broader fiduciary 
obligation for close corporation shareholders, alternative remedies exist for 
oppressed shareholders, such as an equitable claim for dissolution for a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
# * # 
Breaches of fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders 
arise in several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These 
circumstances have been identified as unequal treatment, frustration of 
reasonable expectations of involvement, and a freezeout or squeezeout... 
In all cases there is a common element - a shareholder's investment 
expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another shareholder's 
actions. 
W. at If 24 
Thus, the higher fiduciary duties owed to shareholders in a closely held 
corporation as announced in McLaughlin v. Schenk, supports Judge Kennedy's decision 
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to deny the dismissal of the derivative action, because the duties of loyalty, full 
disclosure, and avoidance of self dealing were all at issue below, and would require a 
higher standard of duty by Mr. Brewster in handling a corporate opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Kennedy's judicial review of the reasonableness of the recommendation to 
dismiss the derivative action was proper, appropriate and required pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based") and 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) ("A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued 
or settled without the court's approval"). Mr. Townsend's report also did not provide a 
sufficient basis to justify dismissal of the derivative action. Finally, the recent Utah 
Supreme Court decision of McLaughlin v. Schenk which adopts higher fiduciary duties 
among owners of closely held corporations, provides further support for Judge Kennedy's 
denial of the motion to dismiss the derivative action given that the duties of loyalty, self 
dealing and full disclosures were wanting in this case. 
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